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For a network formed by nodes and undirected links between pairs of nodes, the network optimal
attack problem aims at deleting a minimum number of target nodes to break the network down into
many small components. This problem is intrinsically related to the feedback vertex set problem that
was successfully tackled by spin glass theory and an associated belief propagation-guided decimation
(BPD) algorithm [H.-J. Zhou, Eur. Phys. J. B 86 (2013) 455]. In the present work we apply the
BPD alrogithm (which has approximately linear time complexity) to the network optimal attack
problem, and demonstrate that it has much better performance than a recently proposed Collective
Information algorithm [F. Morone and H. A. Makse, Nature 524 (2015) 63–68] for different types of
random networks and real-world network instances. The BPD-guided attack scheme often induces
an abrupt collapse of the whole network, which may make it very difficult to defend.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a network or graph G formed by N nodes
and M undirected links between these nodes, how to
delete a minimum number of nodes (the optimal targets
of attack) to break the network down into many discon-
nected small components? This optimization problem is
one of the fundamental structural problems in network
science [1, 2], and it has very wide practical applications,
especially in protection of network structure [3–5] and
in surveillance and control of various network dynami-
cal processes such as the transmission of infective disease
[6–8]. Besides their structural importance, the optimal
target nodes of network attack also play significant roles
in network information diffusion. Many of these nodes
are influential spreaders of information and are the key
objects in viral marketing and network advertisement [9–
11].
The breakdown of a network’s giant connected compo-
nent is the collective effect caused by a set S of nodes.
There are extremely many candidate solutions for the
network attack problem, and minimizing the size of such
a set S is an intrinsically difficult combinatorial opti-
mization issue. This problem belongs to the NP-hard
(non-deterministic polynomial hard) class of computa-
tional complexity, no one expects it to be exactly solvable
by any polynomial algorithm. So far the network optimal
attack problem has mainly been approached by heuristic
methods which select target nodes based on local metrics
such as the node degree (number of attached links) [3–5]
and the node eigenvector centrality [12, 13].
For sparse random networks it is well known that
the typical length of loops diverges with the number
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N of nodes in a linear way, and short loops of length
L  ln(N) are very rare [14–16]. In such networks the
small connected components are mostly trees (no loop
inside), while each giant component includes a finite frac-
tion of all the nodes and an exponential number of long
loops. If these long loops are all cut the giant component
will again break into a set of small tree components. For
random network ensembles, therefore, the optimal attack
problem is essentially equivalent to another celebrated
global optimization, namely the minimum feedback ver-
tex set problem [17]. A feedback vertex set (FVS) for
a network G is a set of nodes which, if deleted, would
break all the loops in the network and leave behind a
forest (that is, a collection of tree components). In other
words, a FVS is a node set that intersects with every loop
of the network, and a minimum FVS is just a node set of
smallest size among all the feedback vertex sets. Because
small components of spare random networks are mostly
trees, a minimum FVS is essentially a minimum set of
target nodes for the network attack problem.
Although the minimum FVS problem is also NP-hard,
a very convenient mapping of this optimization problem
to a locally constrained spin glass model was achieved in
2013 [18]. By applying the replica-symmetric mean field
theory of statistical mechanics to this spin glass model,
the minimum FVS sizes and hence also the minimum
numbers of targeted attack nodes are quantitatively es-
timated for random Erdo¨s-Reny´ı (ER) and random reg-
ular (RR) network ensembles [18], which are in excel-
lent agreement with rigorously derived lower bounds [19]
and simulated-annealing results [20, 21]. Inspired by the
spin glass mean field theory, an efficient minimum-FVS
construction algorithm, belief propagation-guided deci-
mation (BPD), was also introduced in [18], which is ca-
pable of constructing close-to-minimum feedback vertex
sets for single random network instances and also for cor-
related networks. To solve the optimal attack problem
for a network containing a lot of short loops, the BPD
algorithm can be adjusted slightly by allowing the exis-
tence of loops within each small connected component.
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2Such a BPD algorithm can produce a nearly-minimum
set of target nodes to break the giant components.
In 2015, Morone and Makse considered the network
optimal attack problem as an optimal influence problem
and introduced an interesting heuristic Collective Infor-
mation (CI) algorithm [22]. These authors called the
optimal targets of network attack as the optimal influ-
encers of the network to emphasize their importance to
information spreading. In the CI algorithm, each node
i is assigned an impact value which counts the number
of out-going links at the surface of a ‘ball’ of radius `
centered around i; and then the highest-impact nodes
are sequentially deleted from the network (and the im-
pact values of the remaining nodes are updated) until
the largest component of the remaining network becomes
sufficiently small. This CI algorithm was tested on ran-
dom networks and a set of real-world networks and it was
claimed that it beats existing heuristic algorithms [22].
Morone and Makse also compared the results obtained
by CI and BPD on a single random scale-free network
and they found “evidence of the best performance of CI”
[22].
The CI algorithm is local in nature, it considers only
the local structure within distance ` to each focal node
to build the node importance metric. The claim that
such a local-metric algorithm is capable of beating the
BPD algorithm, a distributed message-passing algorithm
taking into account the global loop structure of the net-
work, is indeed quite surprising. Given the importance of
the optimal attack problem in network science, and con-
sidering that only a single network instance was checked
in [22], we believe it will be beneficial to the research
community for us to give a detailed description of the
BPD algorithm for the optimal attack problem and to
perform a systematic comparative study on the CI and
the BPD algorithm. In the present paper, after review-
ing the most essential building blocks of the CI and the
BPD algorithm, we describe simulation results obtained
on three random network ensembles (random ER and RR
networks, whose structures are homogeneous; and ran-
dom scale-free networks, whose structures are heteroge-
neous), and a set of real-world network instances (whose
structures are heterogeneous and highly correlated, and
there are an abundant number of short loops inside).
Our extensive simulation results convincingly demon-
strate that the BPD algorithm offers qualitatively supe-
rior solutions to the network optimal attack problem for
random and real-world networks. Our data reveal that,
both for random and for real-world networks, the solu-
tions constructed by the CI algorithm are far from being
optimal. For example, to break an internet network in-
stance (IntNet2 of Table I, with N ≈ 1.7 × 106 nodes)
following the recipe offered by CI one would have to at-
tack ≈ 1.4 × 105 nodes simultaneously, but actually the
job can be finished by attacking only ≈ 7.3×104 nodes if
instead the recommendations of the BPD algorithm are
adopted. For sparse networks the running time of the
BPD algorithm scales almost linearly with the number
N of nodes in the network, so it is ideally suitable for
treating network instances of extreme sizes.
Let us close this introductory section by pointing out
a potential challenge that network defense practitioners
might have to consider in the near future. Imagine that
certain group of antisocial agents (e.g., terrorists) plans
to carry out an intentional distributed network attack by
destroying a small set of target nodes specified by the
BPD algorithm or other loop-focused global algorithms.
Under such a BPD-guided distributed attack, our exam-
ple results of Fig. 1 (solid line) and Fig. 2 suggest that the
network remains to be globally intact and connected be-
fore it undergoes a sudden and abrupt collapse. For the
defense side, such a ‘no serious warning’ situation might
make it very difficult to distinguish between intentional
attacks and random localized failures and to carry out
timely reactions. We leave this issue of theoretical and
practical importance to further serious investigations.
II. A BRIEF REVIEW ON CI AND BPD
As we already introduced, the goal of the network op-
timal attack problem is to construct a minimum node
set S for an input network G so that the sub-network
induced by all the nodes not in S has no connected com-
ponent of relative size exceeding certain small threshold θ
(e.g., θ = 0.01 or even smaller). The CI algorithm of [22]
and the BPD algorithm of [18] are two heuristic solvers
for this NP-hard optimization problem. For pedagogical
reasons we summarize in this section the main algorith-
mic steps of these two solvers. We do not delve into the
underlying statistical physical ideas and concepts but en-
courage the reader to consult the original references.
Starting from the input network G with N nodes and
M links, both the CI and the BPD algorithm kick nodes
out of the network in a sequential manner. Let us denote
by G(t) the remaining network at time t of the deletion
process, and denote by di(t) the degree (number of neigh-
boring nodes) of a node i inG(t). At the initial time t = 0
all the nodes are present so G(0) is identical to G, and
di(0) = di with di being the degree of node i in G.
A. The Collective Influence algorithm
At each time point t the collective influence strength,
CI`(i; t), of a node i ∈ G(t) is computed as
CI`(i; t) =
[
di(t)− 1
] ∑
j∈∂Ball(i,`; t)
[
dj(t)− 1
]
, (1)
where ∂Ball(i, `; t) denotes the set formed by all the
nodes of G(t) that are at distance ` to node i [22]. The
integer ` is an adjustable parameter of the CI algorithm.
The CI strength gives a heuristic measure of a node’s in-
formation spreading power. It is a product of two terms.
The first term,
(
di(t) − 1
)
, is node i’s direct capacity of
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FIG. 1: The relative size g(t) of the largest connected com-
ponent as a function of algorithmic time t, for an ER net-
work with N = 105 nodes and mean node degree c = 3. At
each time interval δt = 1/N of the targeted attack process,
a node chosen by the CI algorithm or by the BPD algorithm
is deleted along with all the attached links. The three sets of
simulation data obtained by the CI algorithm correspond to
ball radius ` = 2 (dotted line), ` = 3 (dashed line), and ` = 4
(long-dashed line), respectively. The BPD results (solid line)
are obtained at fixed re-weighting parameter x = 12.
information transmission; the second term sums over the
information transmission capacity
(
dj(t) − 1
)
of all the
nodes j at a distance `, it can be understood as node i’s
capacity of information broadcasting.
After the CI strengths of all the nodes in network G(t)
are updated using Eq. (1), a node which has the highest
CI strength is deleted along with all its attached links;
then the time increases to t← t+ 1N , and the CI strength
of the remaining nodes are again updated. This iteration
process continues until the largest connected component
of the remaining network becomes very small.
As an example we plot in Fig. 1 the relative size g(t)
of the largest connected component of an ER network
with mean node degree c = 3. Initially the network has a
giant component of relative size g(0) ≈ 0.9412; this giant
component then shrinks with time t gradually and finally
disappears when about 0.16N nodes are removed.
The results of the CI algorithm are not sensitive to
the particular choice of the ball radius ` (see Fig. 1 and
discussions in [22]). For simplicity we fix ` = 4 in the
remaining part of this paper, except for the two smallest
networks of Table I (for which ` = 2 is used). To decrease
the algorithm’s time complexity, in each decimation step
a tiny fraction f of the nodes (instead of a single node)
is deleted from the network and then the CI strengths of
the remaining nodes are updated. The precise value of f
does not affect the quality of the final solution as long as
f is sufficiently small (e.g., f = 0.001) [22]. The authors
of [22] have made the source code of the CI algorithm
publically available through their webpage. We use their
code in the present comparative study.
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FIG. 2: The relative size g(t) of the largest connected compo-
nent at algorithmic time t of the BPD-guided attack process,
for six real-world networks of different sizes N (see Table I):
Citation (pluses), P2P (crosses), Friend (squares), Authors
(circles), WebPage (triangles), Grid (diamonds). At each time
interval δt = 1/N of the targeted attack process, a node cho-
sen by the BPD algorithm (with x = 12) is deleted along with
all the attached links.
B. Belief propagation-guided decimation
The BPD algorithm is rooted in the spin glass model
for the feedback vertex set problem [18]. At each time
point t of the iteration process, the algorithm estimates
the probability q0i (t) that every node i of the remain-
ing network G(t) is suitable to be deleted. The explicit
formula for this probability is
q0i =
1
1 + ex
[
1 +
∑
k∈∂i(t)
(1−q0k→i)
q0k→i+q
k
k→i
] ∏
j∈∂i(t)
[q0j→i + q
j
j→i]
,
(2)
where x is an adjustable re-weighting parameter, and
∂i(t) denotes node i’s set of neighboring nodes at time
t. The quantity q0j→i(t) in Eq. (2) is the probability that
the neighboring node j is suitable to be deleted if node
i is absent from the network G(t), while qjj→i(t) is the
probability that this node j is suitable to be the root
node of a tree component in the absence of node i [18].
These two auxiliary probability values are estimated self-
consistently through the following set of belief propaga-
tion (BP) equations:
q0i→j =
1
zi→j(t)
, (3a)
qii→j =
ex
∏
k∈∂i(t)\j
[
q0k→i + q
k
k→i
]
zi→j(t)
, (3b)
where ∂i(t)\j is the node subset obtained by removing
node j from set ∂i(t), and zi→j(t) is a normalization con-
4stant determined by
zi→j(t) = 1 + ex
∏
k∈∂i(t)\j
[
q0k→i + q
k
k→i
]
×
[
1 +
∑
l∈∂i(t)\j
(1− q0l→i)
q0l→i + q
l
l→i
]
. (4)
At each time step t, we first iterate the BP equation
(3) on the network G(t) a number of rounds, and then
use Eq. (2) to estimate the probability of choosing each
node i ∈ G(t) for deletion. The node with the highest
probability of being suitable for deletion is deleted from
network G(t) along with all its attached links. The algo-
rithmic time then increases to t ← t + 1N and the next
BPD iteration begins. This node deletion process stops
after all the loops in the network have been destroyed
[18]. Then we check the size of each tree component in
the remaining network. If a tree component is too large
(which occurs only rarely), we delete an appropriately
chosen node from this tree to achieve a maximal decrease
in the tree size (see Appendix A for details). We repeat
this node deletion process until all the tree components
are sufficiently small.
As an illustration of the BPD iteration process, we
record in Fig. 1 (solid line) the relative size g(t) of the
largest connected component of an ER random network
at each algorithmic time t. At t ≈ 0.137 the BPD-guided
attack stops, resulting in a final target node set of size
≈ 0.137N . Qualitatively similar plots are obtained for
real-world network instances (see Fig. 2).
Similar to the CI algorithm, when the BPD algorithm
is used as a heuristic solver, we delete in each decimation
step a tiny fraction f of the nodes in network G(t) and
then update the probability q0i for each remaining node
i. The BPD algorithm is very fast. It finishes in few
minutes when applied on the large example network of
Fig. 1 and most of the network instances of Table I. In
terms of scaling, if the link number M of the network
is of the same order as the node number N (i.e., the
network is sparse), then the running time of the BPD
algorithm is proportional to N lnN (see Fig. 3A for a
concrete demonstration). This algorithm therefore is ap-
plicable to extremely huge network instances. For exam-
ple, when applied on an ER network with N = 2 × 108
nodes and mean degree c = 3, the BPD algorithm re-
turns a target node set of relative size ρ = 0.13574 in
23.50 hours (f = 0.01) and another solution of relative
size ρ = 0.13610 in 14.68 hours (f = 0.03). These relative
sizes are just 0.6% beyond the predicted minimum rela-
tive size of ρ = 0.13493 by the replica-symmetric mean
field theory [18]. In contrast, the relative sizes of the
solutions obtained by the CI algorithm are 23.7% (for
` = 2), 21.5% (` = 3), and 20.8% (` = 4) beyond the
prediction of the replica-symmetric mean field theory.
The original BPD code for the minimum feedback ver-
tex set problem and its slightly adjusted version for the
network optimal attack problem are both available at
power.itp.ac.cn/∼zhouhj/codes.html. The BPD re-
sults of the next section are obtained at fixed value of
deletion fraction f = 0.01. As the example results of
Fig. 3B further demonstrate, the precise value of f does
not affect the relative size ρ of the BPD solutions.
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FIG. 3: Performance of the BPD algorithm (x = 12) and
the CI algorithm (` = 4) on ER networks of mean degree
c = 3 and size N . The results obtained by BPD are shown
as plus symbols (for decimation fraction f = 0.01) and cross
symbols (for f = 0.001), while the results obtained by CI are
shown as square symbols (for f = 0.01) and diamond symbols
(for f = 0.001). (A) The relationship between the total run-
ning time and N . The simulation results are obtained on a
relatively old desktop computer (Intel-6300, 1.86 GHz, 2 GB
memory). The solid and dashed lines are the fitting curves of
the form TBPD = aN ln(N) for the BPD running time TBPD,
with parameter a = 2.896 × 10−5 second (for f = 0.01) and
a = 1.814 × 10−4 second (for f = 0.001), respectively. BPD
CI have comparable time complexity for this graph ensem-
ble. (B) The relationship between the relative size ρ of the
target node set and N . The dotted horizontal line denotes
the predicted minimum value of ρ = 0.13493 (for N = ∞)
by the replica-symmetric mean field theory [18]. The BPD
results obtained at decimaion fraction f = 0.01 are almost
equally good as those obtained at f = 0.001, but the CI re-
sults at f = 0.01 are much worse than the CI results obtained
at f = 0.001.
5C. Gradual decrease versus abrupt drop
Figure 1 clearly shows that, compared to the CI al-
gorithm, the BPD algorithm constructes a much smaller
target node set for the same ER network instance. This
superiority holds true for all the networks we examined
(see next section). We also notice from Fig. 1 that, dur-
ing the CI-guided attack process the size of the giant
connected component decreases gradually and smoothly.
On the other hand, if the attacked nodes are chosen ac-
cording to the BPD algorithm, the giant component ini-
tially shrinks slowly and almost linearly and the decrease
in size is roughly equal to the increase in the number of
deleted nodes; but as the giant component’s relative size
reduces to ≈ 0.76 after a fraction ≈ 0.133 of the nodes
are deleted, the network is in a very fragile state and the
giant component suddenly disappears with the deletion
of an additional tiny fraction of nodes.
Such an abrupt collapse phenomenon, which resem-
bles the phenomenon of explosive percolation [23–25],
is also observed in the BPD-guided attack processes on
other random network ensembles and real-world networks
(Fig. 2). It may be a generic feature of the BPD-guided
network attack. Indeed the BPD algorithm is not de-
signed to break a network down into small pieces but is
designed to cut loops in the most efficient way. This loop-
cutting algorithmic design principle may explain why the
collapse of a giant connected component occurs at the lat-
est stage of the attack process and is abrupt. We expect
that during the BPD-guided attack process, the most
significant changes in the network is that the number
of loops in the giant components decreases quickly. A
highly connected node that bridges two or more parts
of the network will only have a low probability of being
deleted if it does not contribute much to the loops of the
network [18].
III. COMPARATIVE RESULTS
We now apply the CI and the BPD algorithm on a
large number of network instances. We adopt the same
criterion used in [22], namely that after the deletion of a
set S of nodes the largest connected component should
have relative size ≤ θ = 0.01. The size of this set S
(relative to the total number N of vertices) is denoted as
ρ, see Fig. 3B, Fig. 4, and Fig. 5.
Following [22], when applying the CI algorithm to a
network G, we first delete a draft set of nodes from the
network until the largest component of the remaining net-
work contains no more than θN nodes. We then refine
this set by sequentially moving some nodes back to the
network. Each of these displaced nodes has the property
that its addition to the network will not cause an in-
crease in the size of the largest network component and
will only cause the least increase in the size of a small
component. The final set S of deleted nodes after this re-
finement process is regarded as a solution to the optimal
network attack problem. This same refinement process
is also adopted by the BPD algorithm. We first apply
BPD to construct a FVS for the input network, then a
few additional nodes are deleted break very large trees.
Finally some of the nodes in the deleted node set S are
added back to the network as long as they cause the least
perturbation to the largest connected component and its
increased relative size is still below θ. This refinement
process recovers some of the deleted short loops.
A. ER and RR network ensembles
We first consider Erdo¨s-Reny´ı random networks and
regular random networks. An ER network of N vertices
and M = (c/2)N links is generated by first selecting M
different node pairs uniformly at random from the whole
set of N(N − 1)/2 candidate pairs and then add a link
between the chosen two nodes. Each node in the network
has c attached links on average. A RR network is more
regular in the sense that each node has exactly the same
number K of nearest neighbors; it is generated by first
attaching to each node K half-links and then randomly
connecting two half-links into a full link (excluding self-
links and multiple-links).
The target node set S for breaking down a random
network contains an extensive number ρN of nodes. We
find that the BPD algorithm obtains qualitatively better
solutions than the CI algorithm, in the sense that ρBPD
is much smaller than ρCI (Fig. 4). For example, the
CI-guided attack scheme would need to delete a fraction
ρCI ≈ 0.52 of all the nodes to break down an ER network
of mean degree c = 10, while the BPD-guided scheme
only needs to delete a smaller fraction ρBPD ≈ 0.48. The
difference in performance between CI and BPD is even
more pronounced on RR networks (Fig. 4B).
Indeed there is not much room to further improve over
the BPD algorithm. As we show in Fig. 4 the value
of ρBPD almost overlaps with the predicted minimum
value by the replica-symmetric mean field (which is non-
rigorously believed to be a lower bound to the true min-
imum value). For the RR network ensemble, the value
of ρBPD is also very close to the rigorously known lower
bound for the minimum value [19], while the empirical
value ρCI obtained by the CI algorithm is far beyond
this mathematical bound (Fig. 4B).
B. Scale-free random network ensembles
We then examine random scale-free (SF) networks.
The static method [26] is followed to generate a single
SF network instance. Each node i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} is as-
signed a fitness value fi = i
−ξ/
∑N
j=1 j
−ξ with 0 ≤ ξ < 1
being a fixed parameter. A total number of M = (c/2)N
links are then sequentially added to the network: first a
pair of nodes (i, j) is chosen from the network with prob-
ability fifj and then a link is added between i and j if
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FIG. 4: Fraction ρ of removed nodes for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi ran-
dom networks of mean degree c (A) and regular random net-
works of degree K (B). Each CI (diamond) or BPD (circle)
data point is the averaged result over 48 network instances
(size N = 105); the standard deviation is of order 10−4 and
is therefore not shown. The cross symbols are the predic-
tions of the replica-symmetric (RS) mean field theory on the
minimum relative size of the target node sets [18]. The plus
symbols of (B) are the mathematical lower bound (LB) on the
minimum relative size of the target node sets [19]. The re-
weighting parameter of the BPD algorithm is fixed to x = 12
for ER networks and x = 7 for RR networks; the ball radius
parameter of the CI algorithm is fixed to ` = 4.
it does not result in a self-link or a multiple-link. The
resulting network has a power-law degree distribution, so
the probability of a randomly chosen node to have d 1
attached links is proportional to d−γ with the decay ex-
ponent being γ = 1 + 1/ξ [26]. There are many highly
connected (hub) nodes in a SF network, the degrees of
which greatly exceed the mean node degree c.
The BPD-guided attack scheme is again qualitatively
more efficient than the CI-guided attack scheme (Fig. 5).
For example, the BPD algorithm only needs to delete a
fraction ρBPD ≈ 0.338 of all the nodes to break down a
SF network with mean degree c = 10 and decay exponent
λ = 3.0, while the CI algorithm would need to delete a
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FIG. 5: Fraction ρ of removed nodes for scale-free random
networks of mean degree c and degree decay exponent γ = 3.0
(A) and γ = 3.5 (B). Each CI (diamond) or BPD (circle)
data point is the averaged result over 48 network instances
(size N = 105) generated through the static method [26]; the
standard deviation (not shown) of each data point is of order
10−4. The re-weighting parameter of the BPD algorithm is
fixed to x = 12; the ball radius parameter of the CI algorithm
is fixed to ` = 4.
larger fraction ρCI ≈ 0.366 of the nodes. We have also
considered random SF networks with decay exponent γ =
2.67 and γ = 2.5. The obtained results are qualitatively
the same as those shown in Fig. 5. At the same mean
node degree c, the gap between ρCI and ρBPD seems to
enlarge slowly with the power-law exponent γ.
Since there exist many hub nodes, one would expect
that the optimal attack problem is easier to solve on SF
random networks than on homogeneous network. Seeing
that the BPD algorithm performs perfectly for ER and
RR random networks, we anticipate that the solutions
obtained on SF networks are also very close to be mini-
mum targeted attack sets. Further computer simulations
[20, 21] and replica-symmetric mean field computations
[18] need to be carried out to confirm this conjecture.
7TABLE I: Comparative results of the CI and the BPD algo-
rithm on a set of real-world network instances. N and M are
the number of nodes and links of each network, respectively.
The targeted attack set (TAS) sizes obtained by CI and BPD
are listed in the 4th and 5th column, and the feedback vertex
set (FVS) sizes obtained by these algorithms are listed in the
6th and 7th column. The BPD algorithm is run with fixed
re-weighting parameter x = 12, and the ball radius parameter
of CI is fixed to ` = 4 except for the RoadEU and the PPI
network, for which ` = 2.
Network N M
TAS FVS
CI BPD CI BPD
RoadEU 1177 1417 209 152 107 91
PPI 2361 6646 424 350 391 362
Grid 4941 6594 476 320 663 512
IntNet1 6474 12572 198 161 248 215
Authors 23133 93439 3588 2583 9429 8317
Citation 34546 420877 14518 13454 16470 15390
P2P 62586 147892 10726 9292 9710 9285
Friend 196591 950327 32340 26696 48425 38831
Email 265214 364481 21465 1064 20801 1186
WebPage 875713 4322051 106750 50878 257047 208641
RoadTX 1379917 1921660 133763 20676 319128 239885
IntNet2 1696415 11095298 144160 73229 318447 228720
C. Real World Network
Finally we compare CI and BPD on real-world network
instances, which are usually not completely random nor
completely regular but have rich local and global struc-
tures (such as communities and hierarchical levels). Ta-
ble I lists the twelve network instances considered in this
work. There are five infrastructure networks: the Eu-
ropean express road network (RoadEU [27]), the road
network of Texas (RoadTX [28]), the power grid of west-
ern US states (Grid [29]), and two Internet networks at
the autonomous systems level (IntNet1 and IntNet2 [30]).
Three of the remaining networks are information commu-
nication networks: the Google webpage network (Web-
Page [28]), the European email network (Email [31]), and
a research citation network (Citation [30]). This set also
includes one biological network (the protein-protein in-
teraction network [32]) and three social contact networks:
the collaboration network of condensed-matter authors
(Author [31]), a peer-to-peer interaction network (P2P
[33]), and an online friendship network (Friend [34]).
There are an abundant number of triangles (i.e., loops
of length three) in these real-world network instances,
making the clustering coefficients of these networks to be
considerably large.
For each of these network instances the BPD algorithm
constructs a much smaller targeted attack node set than
the CI algorithm does. In some of the network instances
the differences are indeed very remarkable (e.g., the Grid
network, the Email network and the RoadTX network
in Table I). When we compare the sizes of the feedback
vertex sets we again observe considerable improvements
of the BPD algorithm as compared to the CI algorithm.
Similar to what happens on random networks (Fig. 1),
when the BPD-guided attack scheme is applied to these
real-world networks, the giant network components do
not change gradually but experience abrupt collapse
transitions (see Fig. 2 for some examples).
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
In this work we demonstrated that the network opti-
mal attack problem, a central and difficult optimization
problem in network science, can be solved very efficiently
by a BPD message-passing algorithm that was originally
proposed to tackle the network feedback vertex set prob-
lem [18]. In terms of time complexity, the BPD algorithm
is almost a linear algorithm (see Fig. 3A), so it is appli-
cable even to extremely huge real-world networks. Our
numerical results also demonstrated that the local Col-
lective Information algorithm of [22] can not offer nearly
optimal solutions to the network optimal attack problem
(which was re-named as the network optimal influence
problem in [22]). As an empirical algorithm designed to
cut loops most efficiently, the BPD will be very useful
in network resilience studies and in help identifying the
most influential nodes.
Another major observation was that the BPD-guided
attach causes an abrupt breakdown of the network. This
latter dynamical property, combined with requiring only
a minimum number of target nodes, may make the BPD-
guided attack scheme a dangerous strategy if it is adopted
for destructive purposes. The society might need to seri-
ously evaluate such a potential threat and, if necessary,
to implement suitable prevention protocols. An anoy-
mous reviewer suggested to us that it might be sufficient
to compare the largest eigenvalue of the network’s non-
backtracking matrix (also called the Hashimoto matrix)
[37, 38] to distinguish between an intentional attack and
a randomized node deletion process. We hope to explore
this interesting idea in a separate paper.
For simplicity we assumed in this paper that the cost
wi of deleting a node i is the same for different nodes,
i.e., wi = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Let us emphasize that
if this cost is not uniform but is node-specific, the BPD
algorithm is also appicable [18]. The only essential mod-
ification is that the re-weighting factor ex in Eqs. (2), (3)
and (4) should be replaced by exwi .
Note Added: Several closely related papers appeared
on the arXiv e-print server after the first version of this
manuscript was posted on arXiv and submitted for re-
view. The paper of Braunstein and co-authors [39] con-
sidered the network optimal attack problem also as a
minimum feedback vertex set problem, while the paper
of Clusella and co-authors [40] applied the idea of ex-
plosive percolation to the optimal attack problem. The
paper of Morone and co-authors [41] presented a new
8version of the CI algorithm which, at the cost of much
increased computing time, may achieve better solutions
than the original CI algorithm.
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Appendix A: Optimally attacking a tree
Given a tree T formed by n nodes and (n−1) links, how
to choose an optimal node so that after deleting this node
the size of the largest component of the resulting forest
achieves the minimum value among all the n possible
choices of the deleted node? We have implemented a
simple iterative process to solve this choice problem most
efficiently. Here we briefly describe this process.
First we consider all the leaves (i.e., nodes of degree
one) of tree T . For each leaf node (say i) we know that
its deletion will lead to a sub-tree of size (n − 1), and
we let this leaf node to send a message mi→j = 1 to its
unique neighbor j in tree T . After all these leaf nodes
are considered, we delete them from tree T to obtain a
reduced tree T ′, and then we consider all the leaf nodes
of T ′. For each leaf node j ∈ T ′, we let it to send a
message mj→k ≡ 1 +
∑
i∈∂j\kmi→j to its unique neigh-
bor k in tree T ′, where ∂j denotes the set formed by
all the neighboring nodes of j in the original tree T . If
node j is deleted from tree T , the component sizes of
the resulting forest will form the following merged set
{ml→j |l ∈ ∂j\k}∪{(n−mj→k)}, and we can easily iden-
tify the largest member of this integer set. After all the
leaves of T ′ have been examined, we again delete them
to get a further reduced tree T ′′ and we repeat to con-
sider all the leaf nodes of T ′′ in the same way. After a
few iterations all the nodes in the original tree T will be
exhausted, and we will be able to identify the optimal
node i for breaking this tree T .
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